Ernest Sosas A Virtue Epistemology Lecture 2 ✓ Solved

Ernest Sosa’s “A Virtue Epistemology†(Lecture 2) February 16, 2021 Handout- Schiff Summary of overall claims: We ought to understand knowledge not as a single theory but as coming in two varieties, namely, animal knowledge (apt belief, which hits truth through exercise of competence) and reflective knowledge (apt belief and subject aptly believes apt belief to be apt). Sosa provides a virtue epistemology that distinguishes between aptness and safety of performances generally, and of belief in particular. Such an account allows for a further solution (beyond that offered in Lecture 1) to problems of skepticism such as the dream problem. 1. Explains AAA structure An archer’s shot, like any performance (with an aim), can be assessed in terms of an AAA structure // so too can a belief, which counts as a performance, albeit a long-sustained one: • Accuracy- (p) its reaching the aim // (b) its being true • Adroitness- (p) its manifesting the skill or competence // (b) its manifesting epistemic virtue or competence • Aptness- (p) its reaching the aim through the adroitness manifest // (b) its being true because competent 2.

Details core ideas of his virtue epistemology (animal vs. reflective knowledge) a) affirm knowledge entails belief; b) understand animal knowledge (K) as requiring apt belief without requiring defensibly apt belief; and c) understand reflective knowledge (K+) as requiring not only apt belief but also defensibly apt belief (i.e. the subject aptly believes the apt belief to be apt). 3. Analyzes safety and sensitivity of a belief (and of performances generally) • A performance is safe iff “not easily would it then have failed, not easily would it have fallen short of its aim†(25). o That not easily would a belief fail by being false or untrue is required for it to be safe. o A belief p is safe “provided it would have been held only if (most likely) p†(25). • Someone’s belief p is sensitive iff “were it not so that p, he would not (likely) believe that p†(25). • Since such conditionals do not contrapose: a belief can be safe without being sensitive o e.g. the belief that “one is not a brain in a vat fooled by misleading sensory evidence into so believing†(25) • Using the pain vs. discomfort example, he qualifies his claim to state that knowledge requires not outright safety but at most basis-relative safety (see 26). o A belief that p is basis-relative safe iff “it has a basis that it would (likely) have only if true†(26). o A belief that p is basis-relative sensitive iff “it is based on a basis such that if it were false that p, then not easily would the believer believe that p on that same basis†(26).

4. Returns to the skeptic to outline a different line of defense • The skeptic restricts us to bases for belief that are purely internal and psychological, rather than external; Sosa seeks a virtue epistemology that is compatible with but not committed to content or basis externalism (see 27, a-d, for sketch of the argument steps). o The conclusion of the argument is that the skeptic does not refute common sense or even locate a paradox within common sense. 5. Confronts dream skepticism directly • Two ways for the archer’s shot to fail to be safe: Ernest Sosa’s “A Virtue Epistemology†(Lecture 2) February 16, 2021 Handout- Schiff a) due to archer’s level of competence (e.g. affected by drug) b) due to appropriateness of conditions (e.g. weather) • But such scenarios (where the shot is not safe) do not render the shot inapt.

So, a performance can be unsafe and apt. • A performance can also be safe and inapt: o e.g. angel machine provides gust that compensates for natural gust that initially diverts the arrow (that shot is not <accurate because adroit>). • Thus, neither aptness nor safety entails the other. Aptness requires manifesting a competence (a disposition with a basis resident in the competent agent) that would, in appropriately normal conditions ensure, or make very likely, the success of the relevant performance. • Applies reasoning to dream problem: dreams make agent vulnerable with respect to a), i.e. perceptual competence, and b), i.e. appropriate normalcy of conditions • Knower’s belief can remain apt even if unsafe through the proximity of the dream possibility.

6. Investigates whether jokester kaleidoscope red surface example presents a problem (apt belief, but is it knowledge?) • Apt belief simpliciter vs. apt belief aptly noted o Use of animal vs. reflective knowledge to sort this out: individual has apt belief and animal knowledge that the seen surface is red but lacks reflective knowledge (i.e. apt belief that he aptly believes the surface to be red) § Belief that he has apt belief- is this apt? No, because it is not attributable to the relevant competence • So, the perceiver does not have animal knowledge that he has animal knowledge that the surface is red, and therefore lacks reflective knowledge of the color of the surface. 7. Explores whether the dream problem is analogous to the kaleidoscope example • If so, we would have to accept perceptual beliefs as cases of animal knowledge but not reflective knowledge. • However, Sosa investigates further and concludes that the threats in question to the safety of our perceptual beliefs are not threats to their aptness. • He notes that, in response to the dream problem, he goes beyond that of requiring that a belief be safe in order to count as knowledge: it must be apt.

8. Offers final remarks: • Knowledge is apt performance in the way of belief. • Knowledge does not require safety of the contained belief since the belief can be unsafe on account of the fragility of the believer’s competence or situation. • When we sleep and dream, assuming we have perceptual beliefs, these beliefs are not apt beliefs. However, such does not affect the aptness of our perceptual beliefs in waking life. • Bonus- solution to Gettier problem: beliefs can be true and justified without being apt (and hence would not be knowledge on his account) Questions: 1) Is a belief analogous to a performance (e.g. as an archer’s shot) in the relevant ways? 2) What are the criteria for a performer to be granted “credit†for the performance? (see 29) Similarly, what are the criteria for an agent to be granted “credit†for knowledge?

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In "A Virtue Epistemology" (Lecture 2), Ernest Sosa outlines a comprehensive framework for understanding knowledge through the lens of virtue epistemology. This framework differentiates two types of knowledge: animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Sosa's approach integrates concepts of apt belief, safety, and sensitivity into a coherent epistemological structure while addressing significant challenges posed by skepticism.
Sosa begins by introducing the AAA structure that applies both to performances, like an archer's shot, and to beliefs. The three components of this structure are accuracy, adroitness, and aptness:
1. Accuracy relates to whether the performance or belief reaches its intended aim and is true.
2. Adroitness refers to the competence or skill demonstrated through the performance or in forming the belief.
3. Aptness combines the first two; a belief or performance is apt if it achieves its aim through the skill or competence of the performer (Sosa, 2021).
Sosa emphasizes that knowledge, fundamentally, is not merely about having true beliefs; rather, it involves the aptness of belief that is rooted in competence. This leads to his articulation of two types of knowledge:
- Animal Knowledge (K): This refers to knowing something through direct and apt belief without the need for the belief to be defensibly apt.
- Reflective Knowledge (K+): This extends the concept of animal knowledge by requiring that the subject not only holds an apt belief but also reflects on this belief and recognizes it as apt (Sosa, 2021).
A significant part of Sosa's discourse concerns the concepts of safety and sensitivity regarding beliefs. A belief is considered safe if it is unlikely to be false under varying circumstances. Conversely, a belief is sensitive if it is formed in such a way that, if it were false, the individual would likely not hold it. Sosa elucidates that safety is not synonymous with sensitivity, allowing for scenarios in which a belief can be safe without being sensitive (Sosa, 2021).
Moreover, Sosa contends that knowledge does not necessarily require safety. He introduces the notion of basis-relative safety, suggesting that a belief can be based on grounds that would make it likely true, even if those grounds are not infallible (Sosa, 2021). This nuanced distinction permits a robust defense against skepticism by arguing that even in potentially misleading scenarios—like dreaming—an individual can still hold beliefs that are apt, even if they are not safe.
Turning his attention to skepticism, particularly the skepticism posed by dreaming, Sosa argues that dream scenarios can affect one’s competence (e.g., altered perceptions while dreaming), but such compromised conditions do not render belief in waking life inapt. Thus, Sosa posits that beliefs can both be apt and unsafe, drawing a critical line between knowledge and ordinary belief in challenging epistemic conditions (Sosa, 2021).
Sosa also invokes an example involving a jokester with a kaleidoscope as a potential test for knowledge. While the jokester may have an apt belief regarding the color perceived through the lens, he lacks reflective knowledge because he fails to recognize that his belief about his own aptness is not attributable to his competence (Sosa, 2021). This exemplifies the indispensable role of reflective knowledge in the integrity of epistemic justification and stands as a counterexample to claims that apt belief is sufficient for knowledge.
In response to queries about whether a belief can truly be analogous to a performance, Sosa provides clarity. He asserts that the application of AAA structure illustrates that both beliefs and physical performances hold criteria by which they can be appraised. A belief, like a performance, can be subject to evaluation based on skill, success, and the actual achievement of its intended outcome. Credit for both knowledge and performances relies on a combination of aptness (success through skill) and the recognition of such skill, validating them as genuine instances of competence (Sosa, 2021).
So, how does Sosa's virtue epistemology address the criteria for granting credit for performance and knowledge? A performer is credited through the demonstration of skill and the successful achievement of the intended aim. For knowledge, the criteria are somewhat aligned. A knower is credited for having beliefs that showcase competence and are apt in reliably reaching the truth, coupled with an awareness or reflection on the competency of those beliefs (Sosa, 2021).
In summary, Sosa's virtue epistemology posits that understanding knowledge requires acknowledgment of different dimensions—animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. It transcends traditional epistemological frameworks by integrating the concept of virtue into the fabric of knowledge, aiming to address skepticism effectively. The interplay between aptness, safety, and reflective belief provides a compelling lens through which knowledge can be accurately assessed and defended.
In contemplating the deeper implications of Sosa's work, we further recognize that the fusion of competence, situational context, and reflective acknowledgment not only enriches our understanding of knowledge but also emphasizes the inherent responsibilities we carry as knowers. Ultimately, Sosa’s insights provoke vital discussions surrounding the nature of belief and the intricate webs of skepticism that permeate epistemology.

References

1. Sosa, E. (2021). A Virtue Epistemology Lecture 2. [Lecture Notes].
2. Greco, J. (2003). Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Routledge.
3. Sosa, E. (2011). "The Epistemology of Disagreement: A Reflection." The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, 1-25.
4. Pritchard, D. (2004). "Strategies for Cope with Skepticism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(2), 390-392.
5. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
6. Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). "Knowledge in an Uncertain World." Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
7. DePaul, M. (2001). "Indeterminate Stances: A Pragmatic Approach." A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell Publishing.
8. Alston, W. P. (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
9. Bonjour, L. (1985). "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge." Harvard University Press.
10. Coady, C. A. J. (1992). "Testimony: A Philosophical Study." Clarendon Press.