Grading Rubricthis Paper Demonstrates Your Ability To Write And Conduc ✓ Solved

GRADING RUBRIC This paper demonstrates your ability to write and conduct research at the graduate level. The paper is free of any grammar or punctuation errors and includes a well-written introduction, body and conclusion. The paper is organized and includes thoughtful reflections. X/20 Described how Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is used in the entertainment industry. X/15 Defined three forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and applied a minimum analysis of how each ADR would or would not reduce expenses, protect privacy, and be more efficient with time.

X/35 Provided analysis to an ADR case study or analyzed how another dispute could have been handled differently if ADR had been utilized. X/20 Used a variety of evidence appropriately and effectively. Evidence is used logically and supports argument. Published sources are well chosen and properly cited. At least five print or digital sources are referenced in proper APA format (including a minimum of two sources from the Full Sail Library databases).

The paper, including the cover and References pages, are in compliance with all APA style requirements. X/10 CASE STUDY 1 UNIT VII CASE STUDY Read the incident scenario, and write a response that is at least three pages in length. Your response must include answers to the questions being asked. All sources used, including the textbook, must be referenced. Paraphrased and/or quoted materials must have accompanying in-text and reference citations in APA format.

Scenario: You are the Refinery Emergency Response Coordinator for an incident at the SJV Refinery which has been in operation since 1966. The refinery processes 120,000 bbls of crude oil per day, which has a sulfur content of 2.5 percent. The refinery converts crude oil to naptha, light oil, and heavy oils using the Atmospheric/Vacuum Distillation Unit with key equipment such as the following: · · naptha, kerosene, gasoline, and diesel hydrotreaters; · · isomerization unit; · · naptha reformer; · · fluid catalytic cracker; · · coker; · · hydrocracker; · · polymerization unit (petrochemical section of the refinery polymerizing olefin gases to produce polyethylene); · · sulfur recovery Claus plant (catalytic reactors); and · · distillate/gasoline blending tanks.

The refinery was initiating work on a major plant turnaround at the time of the incident to complete required maintenance repairs, mechanical integrity inspections, and modifications to existing equipment. Twenty contractor companies (approximately 150 employees) have been contracted to perform this work under the direction of refinery staff. All of the contractor workers completed the refinery orientation training. Work for the contractor crews is assigned/scheduled each morning. On the day of the incident, the day-shift (6 am to 6 pm) crew had been tasked with isolating the acid gas feed stream for the Claus unit.

Due to other work priorities, the crew did not isolate the line as planned. A shift turnover for the night contractor crew did not happen due to mandatory safety training that delayed their arrival at the worksite. Upon their arrival at the work site, the night crew held a job safety analysis (JSA) review of the scheduled task (line breaking of the acid gas feed line to replace a segment) to be performed and the hazards present. No pressure gauges or monitoring was present to indicate that the acid gas feed line was operational. The crew initiated the line breaking activity (open the line to the atmosphere) at approximately 7:45 pm under self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), which almost immediately resulted in the uncontrolled release of acid gas.

A nearby ignition source from a welding operation ignited the flammable gas. The following actions were initially taken: · · The evacuation alarm was sounded and the refinery emergency response team (ERT) was activated. · · The plant manager and the local fire department were notified of the incident. · · The incident command was established at the refinery office near the main refinery access gate to the south (this is the furthest distance within the refinery boundary from the incident location). · · The refinery ERT incident commander implemented actions required under the approved refinery emergency response plan. · · The ERT was not able to immediately isolate the acid gas feed pipeline. · · The fire department arrived on location and assumed the incident command of the event.

Additional Relevant Information: · · The refinery encompasses an area measuring 2000 feet by 1400 feet. The Claus unit is located in the most northern part of the refinery, approximately 1350 feet from the main refinery access gate to the south. The polymerization unit is operating directly adjacent to the Claus unit. · · The nearest residential community is located approximately 1000 feet to the northeast of the refinery. · · A plastic recycling plant is located along the south fence boundary of the refinery. BOS 3640, Interactions of Hazardous Materials 3 · · A major interstate highway runs directly parallel to the plant, approximately 1/4 of a mile directly north of the refinery. · · The ambient temperature on the day of the incident was 85° F and the wind was blowing at 7 mph from the southwest to the northeast. · · Work crews were scheduled to work 12-hour shifts, 24-hours a day, to complete the refinery turnaround. · · Due to the age of the refinery, SJV has implemented a robust mechanical integrity program. · · The refinery has a trained ERT that can respond to incidents. · · Fixed water monitors are present throughout the refinery to extinguish refinery equipment fires.

The refinery ERT does not fight fires past the incipient stage. · · The refinery has received notices of violation (NOVs) from the local air district in the past several years due to gas and liquid leaks from piping components, such as valves, compressor/pump seals, and for excess sodium dioxide (SO2) emissions related with their sulfur plant. · · Due to historical discharges of organic compounds, groundwater monitoring wells are present down gradient of the facility. Groundwater underlying the plant has historically been encountered at 30 feet below ground surface. · · Hydrogen sulfide is present in the acid gas feed to the Claus plant. The H2S concentration of the acid gas feed is approximately 70 percent by volume.

H2S and sulfur dioxide (SO2) have the following physical properties: Physical Property H2S SO2 Specific Gravity at 68oF (20oC) 1..4 Vapor Density (Air=..22 Flashpoint -116oF (-82.4oC) Not Applicable Autoignition Point 500oF (260oC) Not Applicable Lower Explosive Limit 4.3% Not Applicable Upper Explosive Limit 46% Not Applicable IDLH 100 ppm 100 ppm Questions: 1. Discuss the hazards posed by the interaction of the hazardous materials present at the refinery and adjacent facilities, including the resulting by-products of the incident fire and acid gas release. 2. As the lead refinery representative on the unified incident command (UIC), what actions should be taken by the UIC to respond to this incident (please consider all receptors).

3. If the polymerization unit is engulfed in the fire, how will this affect your response? 4. All emergency responders participated in the post-incident critique. What corrective actions should be implemented by the refinery to prevent the reoccurrence of this incident?

Paper for above instructions

Introduction

The SJV Refinery incident underscores the complex relationship between hazardous materials and the protocols required for their management. Operating since 1966, the refinery processes a significant volume of crude oil daily, leading to various hazards due to the volatile nature of the materials involved. This response will delve into the hazards posed by the incident, detail appropriate responses by the Unified Incident Command (UIC), assess the implications of a fire affecting the polymerization unit, and recommend corrective actions to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.

Hazards Posed by Hazardous Materials

The hazardous materials present at the SJV Refinery primarily include hydrogen sulfide (H₂S), sulfur dioxide (SO₂), and various combustible hydrocarbons. The incident involved the uncontrolled release of acid gas rich in H₂S, a compound known for its extreme toxicity and flammability, particularly at concentrations above its lower explosive limit (4.3%) (PubChem, 2023).

Interaction with Adjacent Facilities

The acid gas release posed significant hazards not just within the refinery but also to adjacent entities, including the nearby residential community, which is situated approximately 1,000 feet to the northeast. The primary risks include:
1. Toxic Exposure: H₂S is classified as an immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) substance at concentrations above 100 ppm (OSHA, 2023). Residents may face acute health risks such as respiratory distress or even fatalities when exposed to high concentrations.
2. Combustion Risk: With the presence of a nearby ignition source from welding operations, the acid gas could ignite, leading to secondary fires or explosions, particularly dangerous in areas with dense structures (ATSDR, 2023).
3. Environmental Contamination: The release of H₂S and SO₂ can result in the formation of acid rain, which can adversely affect the surrounding flora and fauna and lead to long-term ecological damage (EPA, 2023).

Resulting By-Products of the Incident

The combustion of acid gas will yield several by-products, primarily SO₂, which presents its own set of hazards. SO₂ is a respiratory irritant and can contribute to the formation of fine particulate matter in the atmosphere, leading to broader air quality concerns (WHO, 2023).

Actions to be Taken by the Unified Incident Command (UIC)

As the lead refinery representative on the Unified Incident Command (UIC), the immediate response actions should include:
1. Evacuation: Implementing a full-scale evacuation of all personnel from the refinery and surrounding areas to ensure safety. Priority should be given to vulnerable communities nearby.
2. Assessment and Monitoring: Deploying real-time air quality monitoring equipment to assess the levels of H₂S and SO₂, thus enabling the UIC to make informed decisions regarding containment and potential evacuation areas (CDC, 2023).
3. Firefighting Operations: Coordinating with local fire departments to establish a perimeter and engage in aggressive firefighting tactics to control the fire within the Claus unit and prevent spread to the polymerization unit (NFPA, 2023).
4. Communication: Ensuring effective communication with all stakeholders, including local authorities, residents, and emergency responders, to provide updates on the situation and safety measures put into place.
5. Post-Incident Investigation: Initiating a thorough investigation once the immediate crisis has been stabilized to identify causes and evaluate the effectiveness of the initial response.

Impact of Fire on the Polymerization Unit

If the polymerization unit were to catch fire, the response strategy would need to adapt significantly due to increased complexity and risk. The polymerization unit processes olefin gases into polyethylene, making it highly flammable. A fire at this facility could exacerbate several hazards:
1. Runaway Reaction: The presence of heat could lead to a runaway polymerization reaction, producing additional heat and flammable by-products, leading to further risk to emergency responders (AIChE, 2023).
2. Increased Toxic Emissions: The ignition of polymer feedstocks could result in the release of additional hazardous chemicals, compounding the hazards posed by H₂S and SO₂ emissions (CCPS, 2023).
3. Evacuation Zones: The evacuation zone would need to be expanded significantly, considering the increased risk to surrounding communities and emergency responders.
4. Resource Allocation: Emergency resources would need to be redirected to contain the threat to the polymerization unit, which may divert attention and resources from the initial incident, potentially prolonging the outbreak.

Corrective Actions To Prevent Recurrence

Following a post-incident critique, the refinery must implement corrective measures to prevent future occurrences. Some recommended actions include:
1. Improve Communication Protocols: Ensuring that all crews have access to real-time updates on ongoing tasks, emphasizing the importance of communication during shift changes (Jones & Haller, 2023).
2. Enhanced Training: Regular refresher courses on the hazards of H₂S and SO₂ and emergency response procedures are vital. This could include drills focused specifically on acid gas releases and fires.
3. Install Monitoring Equipment: Introduce pressure gauges and monitoring systems to ensure accurate assessments before carrying out critical operations like line breaks (API, 2023).
4. Review Emergency Response Plans: Revisiting and revising emergency response protocols, focusing on incident command structures and the interplay between different emergency response teams.
5. Routine Audits and Inspections: Establishing a routine schedule for mechanical integrity inspections and reviews of safety compliance metrics can help ensure that equipment is up to date and functioning correctly (HSE, 2023).

Conclusion

The incident at the SJV Refinery illustrates the potential hazards associated with petroleum processing facilities, especially concerning hazardous material management. Proactive measures in communication, training, and mechanical integrity management can greatly enhance safety and prevent future incidents. Implementing a robust set of corrective actions is crucial to mitigating risks and safeguarding not only the refinery's workforce but also the surrounding community and environment.

References

1. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). (2023). Toxic Substances Portal: Hydrogen Sulfide. Retrieved from https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/substances/toxsubstance.asp?toxid=98
2. American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). (2023). Guidelines for Fire Safety in the Chemical Process Industry. Retrieved from http://www.aiche.org
3. American Petroleum Institute (API). (2023). Recommended Practice for Handling and Storage of Flammable Liquids. Retrieved from https://www.api.org
4. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2023). Chemical Hazards Emergency Prevention and Preparedness: Emergency Response to Chemicals. Retrieved from https://emergency.cdc.gov
5. Chemical Engineering Safety (CCPS). (2023). Process Safety Management. Retrieved from http://www.aiche.org/ccps
6. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (2023). Air Quality. Retrieved from https://www.epa.gov/air-quality
7. Health and Safety Executive (HSE). (2023). Process Safety: Managing Major Accident Hazards. Retrieved from https://www.hse.gov.uk/
8. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). (2023). Fire Protection for Hazardous Materials. Retrieved from http://www.nfpa.org
9. OSHA. (2023). Hydrogen Sulfide: General Safety and Health Guidelines. Retrieved from https://www.osha.gov
10. World Health Organization (WHO). (2023). Health Effects of Sulfur Dioxide. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/health-topics/sulfur-dioxide