Guidelines For Writing Exercisesnate Charlowjanuary 19 2021grading 1 ✓ Solved

Guidelines for Writing Exercises Nate Charlow January 19, 2021 Grading. 100 points are possible for each writing exercise. Here is how those points are assigned. • Mastery of the text/issue (40). Excellent writing demonstrates a solid and sophisticated understanding of the relevant philosophical text/issue, the evidence of careful reading and study. • Clarity, rigor, and care of presentation (40). Excellent writing clearly articulates central philosophical claims (and clearly explains how the arguments for these claims work); extraneous detail is omitted; a simple and compelling presentation of a philosophical point- of-view is achieved. • Writing and organization (20 points).

Excellent writing uses transparent and easy-to- read prose; it is concise, precise, and pleasant/straightfoward to read. Grading Table Mastery of the text (40 possible) Clarity, rigor, compellingness (40 possible) Writing and organization (20 possible) More information. Here is a useful general resource on writing philosophy papers, written by Jim Pryor. Note that some of Pryor’s advice is only appropriate for longer-form philosophical writing. But a good deal of this advice—for example: use simple prose, make the structure of your writing obvious, explains key claims and terms concisely but also fully—is useful for even short-form philosophical writing (like the kind you’ll be doing in the Writing Exercises).

1 Tips for Papers (Reformulated) 1. Read carefully many times, especially the place where the arguments takes place. 1. Read between the lines using class and tutorial notes. 1.

Try reconstructing the arg. in writing step-by-step. 2. Double-check if the steps lead naturally to the next. 3. Double-check if some step is missing in the logic.

4. Double-check if you duplicate steps or go backwards. 5. Double-check if you put in steps that aren’t needed. 2.

Talk to Prof. and TA, if there is a particular part that is confusing or unclear. 2. Get through each crucial step needed in the arg. 3. Get through the arg. in the shortest route possible.

4. Explain each crucial step in a way that is accessible to someone who is not in philosophy. 1. Remember you are trying to show that you grasp each crucial step in the arg., and also how the steps relate dialectically with the other steps and other views in the debate. 2.

Use the examples to illustrate. 1. Set up an example in a neutral way. 2. Illustrate how the example is used to or may support some part of the overall arg.

3. Reread your writing multiple times while writing it. 1. Double-check that there are not ambiguities. 1.

Try to reread your work in the most uncharitable way 2. See if there are different ways to read your sentences/paragraphs. 3. See if there are different conclusions given different readings of premises. 5.

Critical engagement 1. Don’t repeat what is said. 2. Think of points that have not been considered that have a bearing on points in the arg. 1.

If you agree with arg. A that B, think of reasons why arg. A not valid or sound, and then give reasons why those reasons aren’t compelling, or 2. think of a case that seems to support the claim that B is not true, and show why that case in fact is not conclusive evidence for the claim that B is not true. Paper 2: Resolving Smith’s Moral Problem 3 independently plausible claims are in at least apparent tension (incompatible) with each other. You will need to explain first what that tension is between (MP 1), (MP 2), and (MP 3).

What is the tension? Here’s a hint:1+2 = > X, X + 3 => 🤯 You will need to explain second what are two ways to resolve the tension. Options a. show how the 3 claims are in fact compatible b. show how 1 of the 3 claims is in fact implausible i. show that 1 is false ii. show that 2 is false iii. show that 3 is false You will need to argue why one way is superior to the other way. Breakout Exercise 1 (MP 1: Moral Objectivity) Think of reasons why (MP 1) is false. And who thinks (MP 1) is false?

Breakout Exercise 2 (MP 2: Moral Internalism) Think of reasons why (MP 2) is false. And who thinks (MP 2) is false? Breakout Exercise 3 (MP 3: Humean Motivation) Think of reasons why (MP 3) is false. And who thinks (MP 3) is false?

Paper for above instructions

In contemporary moral philosophy, the discussion surrounding moral objectivity, moral internalism, and Humean motivation presents a compelling and intricate web of ideas that many theorists grapple with. Smith’s Moral Problem articulates a tension between three independently plausible claims: (MP 1) moral objectivity, (MP 2) moral internalism, and (MP 3) Humean motivation. Each claim has its staunch proponents, yet they appear inconsistent when considered together.

Understanding the Tension

At the core of Smith's Moral Problem lies the following claims:
- (MP 1) Moral Objectivity posits that there are moral truths that are independent of our beliefs or feelings. This view holds that moral statements can be objectively true or false, regardless of individual or cultural perspectives (Mackie, 1977).
- (MP 2) Moral Internalism proposes that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivational states; if one truly believes that something is morally wrong, they must have some motivation to act against it (Bratman, 1992).
- (MP 3) Humean Motivation asserts that human beings are primarily motivated by their desires and sentiments rather than by reason; moral judgments arise from emotions rather than objective truths (Hume, 1888).
The crux of the tension is rooted in the interaction of these claims. If moral objects exist independently (MP 1), but motivation is wholly derived from subjective feelings (MP 3), one must question how moral judgments can compel action. Can one uphold moral objectivity without internalism? Conversely, if moral internalism holds true, can it coexist with Humean notions regarding motivation?

Resolving the Tension

To address this tension, one can adopt two main strategies:

Option A: Compatibility of All Claims

One could argue that all three claims are compatible. A proponent of moral realism might contend that while moral truths exist independently, our access to these truths is filtered through our internal motivations. In this view, moral reasoning can lead to objective truths while recognizing that motivation to engage with these truths comes from an emotional place.
For instance, it could be maintained that moral objectivity informs our moral beliefs but does not dictate feelings and motivations (Smith, 1994). Here, moral internalists could argue that the recognition of moral truths stimulates motivation; thus, while the structures of morality remain objective, personal engagement with them may vary broadly according to subjective emotions.

Option B: Dismissing One of the Claims

This option posits that to resolve the tension, at least one of the claims must be dismissed. One could argue, for example, that (MP 1) is implausible. A stronger challenge to moral objectivity posits that ethical beliefs are inherently tied to sociocultural contexts and personal sentiments (Mackie, 1977; Harman, 1977).
Critics of moral objectivity might cite the cultural differences in moral beliefs as evidence against its universality, showing that what is deemed “right” or “wrong” varies drastically, undermining the premise of moral absolutes (Foot, 2001).
In counter to (MP 2), one could contest that moral beliefs do not inherently lead to motivation. A famous counterpoint to moral internalism, presented by philosophers like Steven Darwall (2006), is that individuals can have moral beliefs without feeling compelled to act on them. Hence, (MP 2) itself could be seen as a limitation of human psychology rather than a universal truth.
As for (MP 3), critics like Michael Smith argue that Humean motivation falters when faced with moral reasoning (Smith, 1994). To hold that our motivations are merely derivative of our desires undermines the rigor of moral claims. Ethical reasoning, in this view, can instigate motivations that are not strictly Humean in nature.

Arguing for the Superior Resolution

Between these two options, Option B—dismissing one of the claims—can be argued as superior. This method recognizes the inherent contradictions between the claims and provides a straightforward mechanism for reconciling them. It evokes a realist approach toward morality without succumbing to empirical dilemmas that consistently challenge moral objectivity.
In doing so, we can either reinforce the subjective basis of moral beliefs or reject the frameworks that hinge motivation on moral judgments altogether. This re-examination of premises encourages a more nuanced understanding of how moral reasoning functions in harmony with our psychological dispositions.
Moreover, the dismissal of (MP 1)—moral objectivity—opens the floodgates for richer philosophical explorations into meta-ethics that consider the role of sentiments in moral decision-making and lay bare the cognitive processes at play in ethical reasoning (Railton, 1986).

Conclusion

Concluding, Smith's Moral Problem opens up profound implications for the study of moral philosophy. The tension among moral objectivity, internalism, and Humean motivation presents a compelling puzzle to philosophers, calling into question the validity of each claim when taken together. Examining the possibility of reconciling these claims through compatibility or outright disqualification offers philosophical clarity that challenges us to rethink the structures underpinning ethics.
The examination of motives, beliefs, and the status of moral truths must continue to evolve, actively shaping our understanding of human action and responsibility. As philosophy engages with these complex issues, it remains essential to ground our discussions in rigorous argumentation and compelling presentation, lending fresh perspectives to age-old debates.

References

1. Bratman, M. (1992). Practical Reasoning and Weakness of Will. Philosophical Review, 101(1), 37-61.
2. Darwall, S. (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint. Harvard University Press.
3. Foot, P. (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press.
4. Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford University Press.
5. Hume, D. (1888). A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford Clarendon Press.
6. Mackie, J.L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books.
7. Railton, P. (1986). Moral Realism. Philosophical Review, 95(3), 163-207.
8. Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
9. Smith, M. (2003). The Moral Psychology of Internalism. Ethics, 113(3), 601-634.
10. Kagan, S. (1998). Normative Ethics. Westview Press.