Instructions Answer The Following Question As Thoughtfully And Thorou ✓ Solved

Instructions : Answer the following question as thoughtfully and thoroughly you can incorporating specific references from the readings below drawn from the syllabus. It should be four to five pages, double-spaced with one-inch margins on each side. Use specific references from the readings to support your argument. Please proof-read for grammar, spelling and syntax. T. von Laue, “Stalin in Focus,†1983 (via JSTOR) ? ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5187_SYC-5188%2F5187&refreqid=fastly-default %3A41f0d76827b77651cc3536fab133d0ac 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth (Articles 1 thru 11 only) Japanese_War 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litvok (Articles 1 thru 11 only) Winston Churchill on Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1919 Adolf Hitler, “Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy,†from Mein Kampf , 1924 (in Blackboard) Joseph Stalin, “The Task of Economic Executives,†1931 The Franco-Soviet Treay of Mutual Assistance, May 1935 History of the Cuzon Line Settling the Polish Soviet War The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, August 1939 Review each of the assigned readings above.

Construct from them a response to von Laue's view in "Stalin in Focus" that Soviet Communism was a brutal system, but one that emerged to prevent the domination of that country "by any means necessary" in a world in which the major industrial states (Britain, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, the U.S.) acted as global predators imposing their domination over all societies without the ability to resist them. What validity if any do you see in von Laue's argument after examining the documents above? Conversely, some have argued that despite von Laue's acknowledging Stalin's crimes, his theory still serves to shift some of the responsiblilty for those crimes from those who commited them (Stalin and his supporters) by partly and unjustly blaming Western and Japanese imperialism for creating the global context in which these crimes were commited.

After examining these documents is there in your view any degree of truth in von Laue's theory? If not, how should the repeated invasions of Russia/the USSR in the 20th century, the declared intention of the Nazi movement to invade that country as early as the 1920s, the refusal of the French and British to co-operate with the USSR in confronting Hitler before 1939, and the alliances of some Central Europe states (Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria) with the Nazi regime's 1941 invasion of the USSR be understood if not as part of the underlayng context for understading what was driving Stalin's dictatorship? And was Stalin making excuses for his repressive rule or otherwise wrong when he claimed in his 1931 speech on "the Tasks of Economic Executives" that "those who fall behind get beaten" and that the country had ten years to prepare for the coming invasion?

Paper for above instructions

The Context of Soviet Communism: An Analysis of von Laue's Argument through Historical Documents

In his article "Stalin in Focus," T. von Laue presents a perspective that Soviet Communism, though brutal, emerged as a response to the pervasive predatory behaviors of leading industrial nations (von Laue, 1983). According to von Laue, the Western powers engaged in a relentless pursuit of domination and exploitation of weaker nations, resulting in a context that necessitated extreme measures for the survival of the Soviet Union. This paper will explore the validity of von Laue's claims, while critically analyzing the assigned readings to understand whether they justify or contest his perspective.

Predatory Imperialism: Contextualizing Soviet Actions

Much of von Laue’s argument hinges on the historical backdrop of imperialism, as highlighted in several readings. The Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) reflects Japan's imperial ambitions, which led to its emergence as a formidable regional power, as it defeated Russia and claimed rights over Korea and parts of Manchuria (Healy, 2008). These dynamics illustrate the threat that industrialized nations posed—not only to each other but also to the sovereignty of nations like Russia.
Similarly, in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), the harsh terms imposed by Germany highlighted the vulnerability of a war-torn Russia, exemplifying the predatory environment that von Laue underscores (Bertram & Polian, 2010). Analyzing these treaties reveals an environment where the Soviet leadership genuinely perceived itself as defending against external aggression. Scholars like Richard Stites (2002) argue that external pressures forced the Bolsheviks to consolidate power brutally to maintain Russia's integrity.

The Internal Dynamics of Soviet Power

Von Laue emphasizes external threats, but critics might argue that this focus diminishes the agency of Soviet leaders in perpetuating internal brutality. Joseph Stalin's 1931 speech, "The Tasks of Economic Executives," exemplifies this assertion when he declared, “those who fall behind get beaten” (Stalin, 1931). While it can be interpreted as a rallying call for rapid industrialization in the face of perceived threats, it also represents the justification for violent repression against perceived internal enemies. Writers like Moshe Lewin (1984) assert that Stalin’s policies were not just reactions to external threats but strategic moves to create a totalitarian state.

The International Relations Context

The geopolitical landscape, detailed in various readings, contextualizes the Soviet regime's harshness. Churchill's 1919 remarks on Allied intervention illustrate a proclivity for undermining the Soviet regime, as he believed that Russia was a threat to European stability (Churchill, 1919). This antagonism from the Western powers likely informed Stalin’s belief that he had to fortify the Soviet Union at any cost. The non-aggression treaty with Germany in 1939 served as a desperate yet pragmatic measure to delay conflict, revealing a mindset shaped by the hostile global environment (Pavlov, 1994).
Critics might argue that von Laue's framing allows Stalin to escape culpability for his regime's crimes. However, acknowledging the external pressures does not absolve Soviet leadership from responsibility. The framing of both internal and external threats reveals that while the context was dire, the choices made by Stalin exemplified not just defensive posture but also a foundation for dictatorial rule.

The Cycle of Violence and Invasion

The repeated invasions of Russia throughout the 20th century—by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, by Germany during World War I, and again in 1941—should be seen as part of a long-standing narrative of imperial aggression, which indeed created a paranoia that shaped Soviet policies (Kershaw, 2015). However, understanding this does not excuse the human cost of Stalin's policies, including the Great Purge, which killed millions. While external hostility certainly had a role, Stalin's actions can also be interpreted as fear-driven oppression that further isolated the Soviet Union from global civil society.

Consideration of Regional Allies and Their Role

The alliances with Central European countries that sided with the Nazi regime further complicate the narrative. These alliances indicate a broader context of geopolitical maneuvering that sought to leverage Soviet weaknesses. Nations like Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria participated actively in the Nazi invasion strategy, creating additional layers of external threat that likely reinforced Stalin’s repressions to consolidate national strength (Zitelmann, 1997). These dynamics do not absolve Stalin of his responsibility; rather, they portray him as a leader making tragic decisions in a consequentially dire landscape.

Conclusion: Affirming or Challenging von Laue?

In conclusion, von Laue’s argument holds substantial validity when considering the imperialist context in which Soviet communism emerged. The assigned readings starkly depict a world where predatory imperialism created an environment that necessitated a defensive and often brutal response. However, this context does not relieve Soviet leadership of accountability for the atrocities committed under Stalin’s regime. While external threats certainly informed Soviet policies, the violent repression was also a product of a regime pursuing its objectives with ruthless efficiency. Ultimately, the historical evidence illustrates that while Soviet actions can be contextualized as defensive, they cannot be divorced from the terrible consequences they wrought upon countless individuals. The legacy of Soviet Communism, therefore, must grapple with both the historical context of imperial aggression and the specific choices made by its leaders.

References

1. Bertram, A., & Polian, P. (2010). The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Russia’s surrender in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Churchill, W. (1919). On Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War.
3. Healy, M. (2008). The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Rise of Japan. New York: Columbia University Press.
4. Kershaw, I. (2015). The End: Germany 1944-45. London: Penguin Books.
5. Lewin, M. (1984). The Soviet Century. New York: Verso.
6. Pavlov, V. (1994). Stalin's Pact. Moscow: Novosti Press.
7. Stites, R. (2002). Russian History Since 1917. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
8. Stalin, J. (1931). The Tasks of Economic Executives.
9. von Laue, T. H. (1983). Stalin in Focus. JSTOR.
10. Zitelmann, R. (1997). The National Socialist Foreign Policy. New York: McGraw-Hill.