Moral Personality And Moral Identity Assignmentoverviewyou Will Summa ✓ Solved

Moral Personality and Moral Identity Assignment OVERVIEW You will summarize the assigned readings and devise a lesson plan in the context of higher education. Teaching skills are essential in academia. Reading for comprehension is one thing, and reading for the purpose of teaching is another. You will be given opportunities to read for the purpose of teaching in the context of higher education while thinking about and devising plans for how to deliver of the content of the readings. INSTRUCTIONS Details: Read Chapter .

While completing the assigned readings for the Module: Week, think about which topic to cover in your lecture for college students. State your topic and come up 3-4 objectives. The first heading in the paper should be “Topic and Objectives.†When listing objectives, start with “After this lecture, students will be able to…†2. The second heading should be “Summary of the Lecture Content.†Citing the assigned readings (with pages as necessary), summarize the content to be delivered in class. Your summary should be at least 2 pages, double-spaced.

Do not go over 3 pages. The goal is not to discuss all of the details to be discussed in class but to summarize the lecture content noting the most important concepts in a coherent manner (showing their connections to the overall topic and objectives). 3. Provide a 2-page, double-spaced, lesson plan for an hour-long lecture on the chosen topic. You can be creative here, but provide an outline of the lecture followed by concrete in-class activity/discussion ideas.

Further instructions: 1. This assignment is for your future teaching opportunities, so think concretely about your teaching context as a doctoral-level instructor and make it as useful for you as possible. 2. Use current APA format with appropriate citations and headings as well as a reference Please see the Summary and Lesson Plan page under the Summary and Lesson Plan Resources for a link to Bloom’s Taxonomy information to consider as your write your objectives. Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

Please Use these chapters as a outline for the lesson plan each chapter need to be used CH. 23 Wherein is the motivation to be moral? What instigates, develops, and sustains morally appropriate behavior? This core question has been a recurring conundrum and challenge for the field of moral development, and we seem to have come up short on a satisfactory response. The issue has broad implications: for conceptualization of the breadth and complexity of the moral domain, for the viability of explanatory constructs for moral functioning, and for efforts to implement effective interventions.

So the question of moral motivation is a fundamental and pressing concern. Explanatory notions of moral motivation that dominate the contemporary study of moral development have not been fully adequate to the task. For example, the general notion of self-denying prosociality and empathy (as advanced by Eisenberg, 2005, and Hoffman, 2000, for example) implies that there is no moral value in pursuing personal goals; indeed, self-interest must somehow be suppressed in favor of the interests of others. Similarly, the notion of principled moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981) requires that we universalize our judgments and abstract ourselves from our interests in a situation. And the conceptualization of social understanding advanced by the social domain approach (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1998) separates moral obligations from personal and prudential interests.

The empirical problem of these approaches to moral motivation is the recurring evidence of a relatively weak relation between such constructs and moral action (Blasi, 1980; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Walker, 2004). The conceptual problem of these approaches, argued by Campbell and Christopher (1996) as well, is that they require one to act from obligation and against one’s personal inclinations, which essentially eliminates the motivation to be moral. The fundamental flaw is their contention that morality should not be self-regarding. These approaches reflect the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment Era with its dualistic conception of human nature that pitted reason against passion and with its narrow (formalist) definition of morality that excluded a broader consideration of the self or personality (with which a eudaimonic, Aristotelian perspective might be more compatible).

The moral agent is left disembodied and enervated by these models. Flanagan’s (1991, 2009) philosophical analysis is discerning in this regard. He advances twin arguments: The first is that personal interests, projects, and commitments impart aspects of moral development were the center of considerable conceptual and empirical attention. His moral self model posits the self as the central explanatory concept of moral development, with three constructs, in particular, being primary in understanding individuals’ organization of self-relevant information. First, Blasi argued for the centrality of morality for one’s sense of self (moral self-identity).

In contrast to Erikson’s (1968) view, Blasi held that identity could be constructed around issues other than occupational choice and political orientation; in particular, identity could also be framed by moral concerns, the extent to which would help inform moral motivation. In other words, the centrality of morality in identity can be construed as an individual difference variable. As we shall see, it is this aspect of Blasi’s self model that has sparked the most empirical attention. Second, Blasi emphasized the motivational dynamism of psychological self-consistency. As with theories in many domains of psychology, Blasi’s model holds that individuals tend toward internal self-organization and coherence.

Thus, moral agents are motivated to reduce inconsistency among various cognitions and also between thought and action, at least in their awareness. And, as Bandura (2002) has illustrated, often-unconscious processes of moral disengagement (such as cognitive reconstruals and deflection of responsibility) function corruptively to bolster this sense of moral self-consistency. Third, Blasi’s self model includes judgments of personal responsibility; such judgments implicate the self in action. In other words, it is not sufficient to merely decide what is morally good in a situation; a judgment also has to be made regarding the extent to which what is morally good is also strictly required for the self.

This judgment of personal responsibility extends moral self-identity to concrete action. Blasi (1993) helpfully summarized the essence of his model as follows: Moral understanding more reliably gives rise to moral action if it is translated into a judgment of personal responsibility; moral responsibility is the result of integrating morality in one’s identity or sense of self; from moral identity derives a psychological need to make one’s actions consistent with one’s ideals. (p. 99) Note that Blasi (2004) retained in his model a role for the motivational power of moral knowledge and reason, and he argued that someone who knows moral norms but who does not regard them as requiring adherence for their own sake does not really understand morality.

In this sense, Blasi gave attention to both the content of identity (i.e., specific moral values and ideals) and to the subjective experience of identity. Blasi (2005) provided further theoretical elaboration of his model with a somewhat more characterological twist in specifying various virtues that are critical for the functioning of a moral self-identity. For example, willpower (the capacity for self-control and self-regulation) helps to facilitate moral concerns by putting them into action. But note that willpower is morally neutral in that it can just as well serve nefarious as worthy ends. A second virtue that Blasi posits is integrity of identity, which entails concern for the unity of the self and ensures that behaviors are consistent with one’s moral identity.

Again, this virtue is morally neutral because its moral significance depends on the particular values and commitments that one’s identity may entail. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Blasi contends that moral desires form the essence of moral character, a term CH.24 Morality, in its essence, requires agents whose needs and desires are embedded in social relationships, social institutions, and social groups. Without agents reflectively pursuing goals while aware that others are similarly motivated, there can be machines in motion but no morality (Flanagan, 1991). Relationships, communities, and cultures, therefore, make up the moral space in which life is lived because social life provides the meanings necessary for moral decisions (Taylor, 1989).

In this chapter, we focus on the intersections of identity, community, and development, and weave together research that illuminates the development of each. In previous works, we have explored identity, development, and morality (e.g., Hart, 2005). However, in this chapter we add a focus on moral identity development in the context of community. While there are many conceptions of community, our focus is sociological with an emphasis on common expectations, values, and beliefs that people share and that influence their identity and selfhood (Smith, 2001). Moral Philosophy and Community Over the last 50 years, moral and political philosophies have explored the importance of community as it has been conceived in various ways for understanding ethical life.

Much of this work can be understood as both a reaction and complement to a liberal philosophy positing universal principles of justice. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1992) is arguably the twentieth century’s most important exemplar of an exploration of moral universals. In this work, Rawls described how rational individuals, mindful of their own needs and desires and aware that others have broadly similar constitutions, could engage in reflective discussion to identify just social practices. While Rawls’s argument was and continues to be enormously influential, many scholars have suggested that Rawls’s conclusions are undermined by a failure to appreciate the extent to which different communities of individuals fundamentally differ both in their constitutions of self and in their moral outlooks.

Some of these critical scholars can be labeled as communitarian (e.g., MacIntyre, 1984; Taylor, 1989). Communitarians share the beliefs that: (a) social life varies substantially from one social group to another, and (b) social and cultural practices thoroughly infuse the self (Bell, 2009). Consequently, communitarians would argue that honest, moral deliberation among individuals from different communities may not converge toward agreement on what constitutes just moral practices because those involved in the discussion may have substantially and irreconcilably different notions of what needs and desires of self must be elevated and protected in moral life. Moral communities have sets of shared norms that guide members’ behavior (Haidt, 2007).

Haidt argues, from an evolutionary perspective, that these shared norms allow communities to survive and prosper or, to use his words, “bind and build†(p. 1000). Individual conduct is shaped by these norms as a result of people forming their identities vis-à -vis the collective (Appiah, 2005). In the case of moral norms, ethical obligations to act are internal to the self as a member of the collective. Collective-based identities can influence one’s interpretation and crafting of his or her sense of self, the life projects one pursues, and the meaning of one’s actions.

The consequence is that communities can shape moral life by outlining moral responsibilities that are integrated into identities. Community norms change over time. Appiah (2010) chronicles how historical changes in community norms, particularly those that affect one’s sense of honor, lead to moral transformations within societies. Honor, Appiah argues, arises from aligning one’s behavior and identity with the moral norms and standards of one’s community. By meeting these standards, one garners respect from others and gains pride in oneself.

Failure to meet these standards contrastingly elicits contempt from others and produces shame toward oneself. We return to these ideas later in the chapter. As reflected in recent trends in moral philosophy, we believe a deeper focus on the connection between communities and moral development is warranted. Yet the psychological literature on moral identity development has underemphasized the role that community has on the emergence of moral identity (see Hardy & Carlo, 2011). This is somewhat surprising given the historic centrality of community in identity development.

In Erikson’s CH. 25 The Personal and the Moral This chapter will focus upon the development of concepts about social actions that individualsconsider to be personal matters of choice and privacy that fall outside of considerations of right and wrong (Nucci, 1981, 1996; Nucci & Turiel, 2000; Smetana, 2006). By definition, the personal is positioned in a dialectical relationship with the norms and conventions of society, and moral considerations of interpersonal welfare and individual rights. The contribution of the personal to moral growth stems from those interactions (Nucci & Turiel, 2007) and from the role the personal plays in constructing moral concepts about rights as freedoms (Helwig, 2006; Helwig, Ruck, & Peterson-Badali, this volume; Nucci, 1996, 2000).

This chapter will explore those interrelationships following a discussion of research findings on the emergence of the personal in early childhood, its function in psychological development, and its cultural generality. Foundations and Theory As described in other chapters in this volume, social cognitive domain theory proposes that social cognition is structured within basic conceptual frameworks that account for qualitatively differing components of our social interactions (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, this volume; Turiel, 1983, this volume). The basic domains that have been defined to date are: moral (concepts about fairness, harm, welfare, and rights); societal (concepts about social organization, social systems, and social conventions); and psychological (concepts about persons, self, identity, and internal states).

Reasoning about personal issues is structured by conceptions of the role that decisions over personal and private matters have for the construction of what is socially individual or unique about the decision maker (Nucci, 1996), and related understandings of the function that control over those decisions has for the establishment of agency and autonomy (Helwig, 2006). Within social cognitive domain theory concepts about personal issues are considered to be part of the psychological domain of conceptions about personhood, self, and identity (Nucci, 1996; Smetana et al, this volume; Turiel, 1983). Studies with children and adolescents have determined that the content of personal diaries, phone calls, and letters (and who should have access to them); aspects of personal appearance; form of play or recreation during free time; and control over one’s own body (such as food preferences) are examples of issues that are treated as personal (Nucci,1981, 1996; Smetana, 2002).

Individuals justify their selection of issues as personal on the grounds that they are matters that primarily impact the actor, and that control over those decisions and activities is important to their sense of autonomy and individuality (Helwig, 2006; Nucci, 1996). These justifications point toward an internally consistent framework for reasoning about personal matters that is quite distinct from the ways in which individuals conceptualize the societal and interpersonal functions and purposes of social conventions and evaluations of moral actions. Prototypical situations involving personal judgments, such as choosing what color shirt to wear, will primarily involve personal reasoning. A basic premise of social cognitive domain theory, however, is that many social situations are multifaceted and may engage concepts across domains (Smetana et al., this volume; Turiel, 1983).

This is the case with judgments about the personal in contexts that also elicit reasoning about morality or social conventions. For example, a judgment about what color shirt to wear ceases to be solely a personal matter in social contexts where dress is prescribed by local conventions such as a school or work setting, or in the military (Nucci, 2000; Smetana & Bitz, 1996). Smetana’s (2011) extensive research with adolescents and parents has illustrated how differing perspectives on the personal rather than prudential or conventional nature of social events, such as dress, serves as a source of adolescent–parent conflict. As will be discussed below, the intersection between what is personal and conventional varies considerably across cultures, although the basic claim to a personal zone of privacy and choice appears to be a cultural universal.

One’s personal decisions also may intersect with morality. First, as will be discussed further below, claims to a personal zone inform the construction of moral concepts of rights as freedoms (see Helwig et al., this volume; Nucci, 1996). Second, one’s personal decisions can have moral implications that extend beyond the immediate personal action or choice. For example, the decision to drink coffee rather than tea is a personal matter. Drinking coffee is an action that primarily impacts the self, does not constitute an issue of harm or welfare, and is not in conflict with Western social conventions.

From the perspective of the individual, one’s preference for coffee is an action that is emblematic of personal autonomy. However, deciding whether to buy coffee from one vendor rather than another may have moral ramifications stemming from the farming practices employed to grow the coffee beans, and whether the growers and vendors compensate their workers fairly. An individual attending to these implications would engage both their personal decision making (preferring coffee to tea) and moral concepts centering on concerns for fair and safe labor practices in selecting a brand of coffee that was both personally satisfactory and morally right. In so doing, the individual would be engaged in what social domain theorists characterize as domain coordination (see Smetana et al., this volume). As will be discussed in greater detail below, one aspect of moral development is the increased capacity to coordinate moral considerations with personal goals and interests in multifaceted social situations.

Paper for above instructions

Topic: Moral Personality and Moral Identity in Higher Education
Objectives:
After this lecture, students will be able to:
1. Identify key components of moral personality and moral identity as proposed by Blasi (1993) and other scholars.
2. Analyze the relationship between community values and individual moral development, referencing contemporary moral philosophy.
3. Evaluate how personal motivations and community norms intersect in the context of moral decision-making.
4. Apply theoretical concepts of moral identity and personality to a real-world scenario, demonstrating an understanding of their implications.

This lecture will explore the intricate relationship between moral personality and moral identity, drawing upon ideas from various scholars, including Blasi (1993, 2005) and socio-cultural theorists. The discussion will begin by addressing the question of moral motivation and how it serves as the bedrock for understanding moral behavior. Historically, moral motivation theories have grappled with the intricate dynamics between self-interest and altruism. Generally, mainstream theorists have suggested that moral actions arise either from self-denial or rational moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Eisenberg, 2005).
However, these theories have faced empirical critiques, particularly regarding their limited predictive power in relating moral ideals to actual moral behavior (Blasi, 1980; Walker, 2004). Blasi's model of personal moral identity is significant in that it adequately links moral understanding with moral actions by asserting that a person's morality is deeply intertwined with their self-concept. The implications of Blasi's ideas indicate that moral selves are motivated not merely by obligations, but rather by an intrinsic drive to align one's actions with moral ideals, fostering personal responsibility in moral situations (Blasi, 1993).
A discussion of community values will follow, grounded in the work of communitarian thinkers such as MacIntyre (1984) and Taylor (1989), who contend that moral decisions cannot be entirely removed from the community context. These scholars argue that moral life is significantly shaped by shared norms and values of one’s community (Haidt, 2007). Honesty, integrity, and honor are crucial in defining moral identity. Appiah (2005) emphasizes that individual identities are often constructed in relation to the collective, affecting one's understanding of responsibility and moral action.
Research indicates that community embeddedness can significantly contribute to moral development (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). The emphasis on community challenges the liberal perspective, which posits universal principles of justice and undermines the significance of local norms and shared ethical perspectives (Rawls, 1992).
Finally, the lecture will focus on the interplay of personal choice and societal norms as articulated by Nucci (1981; 1996). The moral implications of personal decisions often lead to conflicts that arise between societal conventions and individual autonomy. These situations provide a rich ground for moral development, encouraging individuals to negotiate the space between personal agency and societal expectations.
This synthesis of various theories will help students articulate the complexities of moral personality and moral identity, underscoring how these constructs are relevant not only in abstract discussions but also in actionable contexts such as ethical decision-making and moral education in their personal and professional lives.

Title: Understanding Moral Personality and Moral Identity
Duration: 60 minutes

Lesson Outline

1. Introduction (10 minutes)
- Present the guiding questions: What motivates us to be moral? How does our community shape our moral identity?
- Briefly introduce course topics to set context (e.g., moral personality, moral identity).
2. Lecture Content Delivery (25 minutes)
- Discuss moral motivation theories, including critiques (referencing Blasi, Walker, and others).
- Transition to community influences on morality, presenting communitarian perspectives versus liberal approaches.
- Dive into the implications of individual choice versus community norms (using Nucci's and Appiah’s theories).
3. Discussion and Activity (15 minutes)
- Activity: Students will break into small groups and analyze case studies where personal choice intersects with moral dilemmas. Each group will discuss:
- The community norms reflected in the situation.
- How those norms shape the individual’s moral identity.
- Each group will share insights, fostering a class-wide discussion.
4. Conclusion and Q&A (10 minutes)
- Summarize key points from the lecture.
- Open the floor for questions, encouraging students to reflect on how the lecture connects with their own experiences.

In-Class Activities/Discussion Ideas

1. Case Studies:
- Provide examples of ethical dilemmas involving community and personal choice, prompting students to analyze them through the lens of moral personality and identity.
2. Reflection Journals:
- Ask students to write a brief reflection on how community values shape their moral decisions and identities, which they can submit as a follow-up assignment.
3. Role-Playing Scenarios:
- Create hypothetical situations that require students to navigate conflicting personal desires and community moral standards, promoting active engagement with lecture concepts.
4. Socratic Seminar:
- Facilitate a seminar-style discussion on: Is morality a matter of personal choice or dictated by the community? This will encourage students to articulate their views and consider diverse perspectives.

References

1. Appiah, K. A. (2005). The Ethics of Identity. Princeton University Press.
2. Appiah, K. A. (2010). Experiments in Ethics. Harvard University Press.
3. Bandura, A. (2002). A socially embedded agent. In Social Psychology and the Law.
4. Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 88(1), 1-45.
5. Blasi, A. (1993). The role of moral identity in moral functioning. In Moral Development.
6. Eisenberg, N. (2005). Empathy and moral development. Human Development, 48(3), 155-156.
7. Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011). Identity and morality: A new direction in the moral development literature. Social Psychology of Education, 14(3), 393-411.
8. Haidt, J. (2007). The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom. Basic Books.
9. Kohlberg, L. (1981). The Philosophy of Moral Development. Harper & Row.
10. Nucci, L. P. (1981). Social conflicts and the development of moral concepts in children. Child Development, 52(3), 755-763.
This framework presents a comprehensive approach to understanding moral personality and identity that is directly applicable to higher education contexts, underscoring the significance of community in shaping individual moral ideologies and actions.