Name Industrial Wastewater Man ✓ Solved

Name ________________________________________ Industrial Wastewater Management (ESHS-614) Homework Assignment # Points 1. Using the NY State Water Quality Standards given in 6 NYCRR Part 703, find the water quality standards for the following pollutants in the indicated receiving stream. (1 point each) Part 703 Surface Water and Groundwater Quality Standards and Groundwater Effluent Limitations TOG 1.1.1. Ambient Water Quality Standards and Guidance Values and Groundwater Effluent Limitations a. What is the water quality standard for turbidity in a Class GA stream? b. What is the water quality standard for chlorobenzene in a Class A stream based on fish consumption? c.

What is the aquatic chronic water quality standard for nickel in a Class B stream? d. What is the water quality standard for “Oil and floating substances†for a Class C stream? e. What are the numerical water quality standard, the type of WQ Standard and the basis code for Chloride in a Class AA stream? (2 points) 2. What does a basis code of “U†mean in the NY State Water Quality Standards? (1 points) 3. Provide the descriptions/definitions of the following types of water quality standard classes. (1 point each) a.

H(FC) b. A(C) c. E(FS) d. R 4. What is an “impaired water†and who makes the determination of impairment? (2 points) 5.

List at least 8 types of information about the facility and its discharge(s) (other than the applicant’s company name and address and contact information) that must be included in the SPDES permit application for a wastewater discharge. (7 points) Industrial Wastewater Management, Homework #6 Page 1 Utilitarianism/9 formula should be correctly understood. I believe that the very imper- fect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception; and that could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatly simplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard, I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken interpre- tations of its meaning.

Having thus prepared the ground, I shall after- wards endeavour to throw such light as I can upon the question, consid- ered as one of philosophical theory. Chapter 2 What Utilitarianism Is. A passing remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong, use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the philo- sophical opponents of utilitarianism, for even the momentary appear- ance of confounding them with any one capable of so absurd a miscon- ception; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the contrary ac- cusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its grossest form, is another of the common charges against utilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of persons, and often the very same persons, denounce the theory “as impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practi- cably voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility.†Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but plea- sure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things.

Yet the common herd, in- cluding the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shal- low mistake. Having caught up the word utilitarian, while knowing noth- ing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the 10/John Stuart Mill rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment; as though it implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning.

Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this utter degradation.1 The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the ab- sence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question.

But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than plea- sure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit—they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemp- tuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrad- ing light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposi- tion were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the Utilitarianism/11 same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast’s pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conceptions of happi- ness.

Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appe- tites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as plea- sures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former—that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature.

And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite com- patible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a plea- sure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible an- swer.

Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable plea- sure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally ac- 12/John Stuart Mill quainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.

Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would con- sent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better sat- isfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesir- able in their own eyes.

A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.

Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness—that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior—confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose ca- pacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imper- fect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bear- able; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed uncon- Utilitarianism/13 scious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify.

It is better to be a human being dis- satisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher plea- sures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher.

Men often, from infirmity of charac- ter, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sen- sual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good. It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful en- thusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indo- lence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of plea- sures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote them- selves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other.

Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying.

It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever know- ingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both. From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the 14/John Stuart Mill judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity.

What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particu- lar pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher fac- ulties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is suspectible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit.

But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous. According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experi- ence, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self- observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is

Paper for above instructions

1. Water Quality Standards from NY State Regulations System (6 NYCRR Part 703)

a. Water Quality Standard for Turbidity in Class GA Stream

In New York State, the water quality standard for turbidity in a Class GA stream is set to a maximum of 5 NTU (Nephelometric Turbidity Units) above natural conditions (NYS DEC, 2023). Class GA waters are designated for the primary contact recreation and for the protection of a fish, shellfish, and wildlife habitat.

b. Water Quality Standard for Chlorobenzene in a Class A Stream Based on Fish Consumption

For Class A streams, which require protection for fish consumption, the water quality standard for chlorobenzene is set at 0.003 mg/L. This standard helps ensure that the water bodies are safe for fishing and human consumption (NYS DEC, 2023).

c. Aquatic Chronic Water Quality Standard for Nickel in a Class B Stream

In a Class B stream, the aquatic chronic water quality standard for nickel is set at 0.8 µg/L. This standard aims to protect aquatic life and ensure sustainability within the ecosystem (NYS DEC, 2023).

d. Water Quality Standard for Oil and Floating Substances in a Class C Stream

The water quality standard for oil and floating substances in a Class C stream is defined as less than 15 µg/L. Class C waters are primarily suitable for fishing and non-contact recreation (NYS DEC, 2023).

e. Water Quality Standard, Type of WQ Standard, and Basis Code for Chloride in a Class AA Stream

The numeric water quality standard for chloride in a Class AA stream is 230 mg/L. The type of water quality standard is a numerical limit, and the basis code is "U," indicating that the standards are based on the protection of the highest quality water and applicable to drinking water sources (NYS DEC, 2023).

2. Meaning of Basis Code "U"

The basis code "U" in the NY State Water Quality Standards indicates that the standard is based on the necessity to protect human health and aquatic life, particularly in water bodies designated as high-quality sources of drinking water (NYS DEC, 2023).

3. Descriptions/Definitions of Water Quality Standard Classes

a. H(FC)

Class H(FC) stands for "High Quality Waters (Fish Consumption)." These waters are protected for human ingestion through fish consumption and support significant aquatic populations.

b. A(C)

Class A(C) refers to waters designated for "primary contact recreation," providing a standard for high-quality swimming and recreational means. This water type must be free from contamination based on both physical and chemical standards.

c. E(FS)

Class E(FS) pertains to waters that are exceptional for fish spawning. These waters are monitored for stricter quality to support the spawning life cycles of aquatic species, primarily fish.

d. R

The "R" classification stands for waters designated as "Recreational." These waters are managed primarily for recreational purposes and may have varying criteria based on the intensity of use and other factors affecting water quality.

4. Definition of an “Impaired Water” and Determination of Impairment

An "impaired water" is defined as a water body that does not meet the water quality standards as established by regulatory bodies (USEPA, 2023). The determination of impairment is conducted by the State Environmental Protection Agency, which assesses water quality based on chemical, physical, and biological data.

5. Facility and Discharge Information Required in a SPDES Permit Application

When applying for a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit, the following information must be included:
1. Facility types and activities.
2. Location of discharge points.
3. Description of the wastewater generation and management practices.
4. Quantity and quality of all discharges.
5. Potential effects on local flora and fauna.
6. Best Management Practices (BMPs) employed.
7. Preparedness and emergency response plans for spills/accidents.

References

1. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. (2023). "Water Quality Standards - 6 NYCRR Part 703." Retrieved from [NYS DEC](https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8490.html).
2. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2023). "Water Quality Standards and Strategies." Retrieved from [USEPA](https://www.epa.gov/wqs-tech).
3. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. (2023). "Water Quality Standards and Uses." Retrieved from [NYS DEC](https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/29228.html).
4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2023). "Understanding Turbidity." Retrieved from [NOAA](https://www.noaa.gov).
5. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. (2023). "Aquatic Life Water Quality Standards." Retrieved from [NYS DEC](https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8492.html).
6. U.S. Geological Survey. (2023). "Chloride in Surface Waters." Retrieved from [USGS](https://www.usgs.gov/mission-areas/water-resources).
7. New York Department of Environmental Conservation. (2023). "Water Quality Assessment." Retrieved from [NYS DEC](https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/2002.html).
8. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2023). "Impaired Waters and TMDLs." Retrieved from [EPA](https://www.epa.gov/impaired-waters).
9. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. (2023). "Standards and Guidance." Retrieved from [NYS DEC](https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/86500.html).
10. Environmental Protection Agency. (2023). "SPDES Permit Application Requirements." Retrieved from [USEPA](https://www.epa.gov/npdes).
In providing this comprehensive overview of industrial wastewater management standards, this assignment elucidates critical aspects of water quality regulations within New York State, serving as a necessary guide for future industrial practices.