Philosophy &101/Spring 2019 Homework #2: 45 Points Shapiro ✓ Solved

This assignment is intended to get you thinking more about personal identity, the mind-body problem, and the nature of knowledge and truth.

1) Undertake a little “experiment in consciousness.” Do something (or nothing) for 30 minutes. The main thing is that you are alone with your thoughts: no phone, no computer, no one else to talk to. During that time, observe your “self.” Who/What is that self you are observing? Say a little bit about it. What theory of personal identity does your answer incline you toward? Be sure to explain whether you subscribe to the “illusion theory,” the “body theory,” the “soul theory,” or the “memory theory,” and why. What does your answer say about your position on the mind-body problem? Are you a dualist, a physicalist, or an idealist? Why?

2) Now, examine what you claim to know about yourself in light of Descartes’ process of doubting. Is your piece of knowledge subject to doubt by the Dream Argument? Explain. Is it subject to doubt by the Evil Demon Argument? Explain. Having subjected your piece of knowledge to Cartesian doubt, do you still know it? Why or why not?

3) Finally, consider something you claim to know as a result of your experiment about the external world. (Of course, you’re entitled to say you know nothing, but if so, explain why.) Say what that claim is and how you claim to know it. Is your knowledge justified on rationalist or empiricist grounds? That is, is it a priori or empirical? Explain. What does this imply regarding the certainty of this knowledge? Be sure to talk about how empiricism is seen to only yield probability and not certainty and why. (Good answers here will refer, at least in part, to the Salmon article).

Paper For Above Instructions

In undertaking this exploration of consciousness, I engaged in thirty minutes of solitary reflection, devoid of distractions such as my phone or computer. The experiment aimed to peel back the layers of my mental processes and confront the essence of my self. During this introspection, I recognized a myriad of thoughts, emotions, and fleeting images that coalesced into the notion of a self. This self appeared not as an immutable entity but as a dynamic formation, continually shaped by memories, experiences, and aspirations.

This immediate observation led me to align with the memory theory of personal identity, as my sense of self seemed deeply entwined with recollections of past experiences. According to this theory, personal identity is not based on a singular substance but rather on a continuity of experiences that inform who we are at any given moment (Locke, 1690). Memory allows us to create a narrative thread that connects our past, present, and potential future selves, reinforcing a sense of identity that may shift yet retain coherence over time.

Addressing the mind-body problem, my reflections incline towards physicalism. Physicalists assert that everything about human existence, including consciousness, can be explained in terms of physical processes and interactions (Churchland, 1986). I resonate with this perspective because my self-exploration emphasizes the importance of the brain and body in shaping thoughts and feelings. However, as I consider the implications of this stance, I find myself grappling with the complexities of subjective experiences that seem to elude purely physical explanations. This leads to the acknowledgment of my dualistic inclinations; despite favoring physicalist explanations, I cannot fully dismiss the subjective quality of experience itself, suggesting that the relationship between mind and body is complex and multifaceted.

Moving onto Descartes' process of doubting, I reflect upon my knowledge of self-awareness derived from the introspection experiment. Descartes posited that if there is a chance that one might be dreaming or deceived by an evil demon, one must rigorously examine the certainty of any knowledge claims (Descartes, 1641). The Dream Argument challenges the reliability of sensory knowledge by postulating that our experiences could simply be illusions (Descartes, 1641). Through this lens, I am led to examine whether my awareness of self might also be doubted. While reflecting, it became apparent that despite the complexities and potential illusions, my subjective experience of being aware of my thoughts and feelings still holds a kind of truth. However, through the Evil Demon Argument, which suggests the possibility of a powerful deceiver manipulating our perceptions, I acknowledge that any certainty surrounding my self-knowledge remains elusive (Descartes, 1641). Thus, while I hold a profound sense of self-awareness, the foundations of that knowledge appear tenuous under rigorous scrutiny.

Ultimately, I conclude that I do still possess some knowledge of my existence, yet it operates under a veil of uncertainty. Even though Cartesian doubt casts shadows upon the certainties I cling to, I find that the subjective nature of my thought process affirms my existence—if I am doubting, I must be thinking, and hence, I am (Cogito, ergo sum). The interplay between subjective experience and rational doubt reveals a nuanced understanding of knowledge, shaped by the contexts in which it is situated.

Furthermore, I considered my knowledge of the external world as informed by my introspective exercise. Specifically, I found clarity in understanding that my consciousness allows me to perceive the world as I grasped the nature of my thoughts and emotions. In this context, the claim I make is that I can know I exist in a reality influenced by both my sensory perceptions and cognitive processes. My knowledge appears to be empirical, grounded in experience yet informed by rational thought. The empirical acquisition of knowledge implies adherence to a framework where experiences shape understanding—a position endorsed by Hume and later by Salmon (1990), emphasizing that knowledge derived from sensory experience only yields a degree of probability, not absolute certainty. This leaves my knowledge teetering on the edge of skepticism, where certainty remains elusive, but rational justification upholds its significance.

In conclusion, the contemplative experiment illuminated the interwoven complexities of identity, consciousness, and the boundaries of knowledge. My inclinations towards the memory theory of personal identity and an empirical understanding of knowledge have offered pathways for navigating these philosophical challenges. Yet, through Descartes' lens of doubt, I am left poignantly aware that certainty is but a fragile construct in the landscape of human understanding.

References

  • Churchland, P. M. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.

  • Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy.

  • Locke, J. (1690). Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

  • Salmon, W. (1990). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press.

  • Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature.

  • Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.

  • Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.

  • Searle, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.

  • Nagel, T. (1979). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435-450.

  • Sartre, J.-P. (1943). Being and Nothingness. Washington Square Press.