For this Assignment, download and read the \"LS312_Unit4_AmtrakCaseStudy\" file
ID: 111007 • Letter: F
Question
For this Assignment, download and read the "LS312_Unit4_AmtrakCaseStudy" file from Course Resources, Course Documents. Prepare a 3-page analysis that answers the following questions:
Introduction
Who are the stakeholders in this case?
What are the interests of the stakeholders?
Corporate Social Responsibility
What was this corporation's corporate social responsibility to the various stakeholders in this case before the incident?
What is this corporation's corporate social responsibility to the various stakeholders in this case after the incident?
Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the above, as well as what you have learned about ethical theories and foundations of moral development, what is your final recommendation to the corporation regarding how to proceed after the incident?
Your recommendation should be at least 2 paragraphs and include at least three reasons, with specific references to authoritative sources, stating how you arrived at that conclusion.
The Wreck of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited H. Richard Eisenbeis, Sue Hanks, and Bruce Barrett University of Southern Colorado
Explanation / Answer
The Wreck of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited H. Richard Eisenbeis, Sue Hanks, and Bruce Barrett
University of Southern Colorado On September 22, 1993, the Sunset Limited, thepride of Amtrak, glided swiftly along through thewarm, fall night. A dense fog hugged the countryside. Because there was nothing to see through thetrain’s windows, many passengers dozed peacefully,lulled to sleep by the gentle, rhythmic, clickety-clack
of iron wheels passing over jointed rails. Crewmembers roamed the aisles and halls making sure thatthose guests still awake were accommodated andcomfortable. In less than a second, this peacefulscene was shattered by a thundering roar as seatswere torn from the floor and passengers were sentflying through the cars. At 2:53 a.m. Amtrak’s onlytranscontinental passenger train, the Sunset Limited,plunged into Big Bayou Canot, killing 47 passengers. Eight minutes earlier at 2:45 a.m., a towboat,pushing six barges and lost in a dense fog, unknowingly bumped into the Big Bayou Canot Bridgeknocking the track out of alignment. The train, traveling at a speed of 72 mph in the dense fog, derailedas a result, burying the engine and four cars five stories deep in the mud and muck of Big BayouCanot.4,7,8,10,12,13Bruce Barrett, a locomotive engineer, hasdescribed what might have been occurring in the cabof Amtrak engine Number 819 prior to the wreck.2This scenario is based upon my 17 years’experience as a locomotive engineer on a major western railroad and upon the compilation of
bits and pieces of data from public records and accounts of the accident.
Engineer Michael Vincent was at the controlsof the two-week-old General Electric “AMDCopyright © 1999 by the Case Research Journal, H. Richard Eisenbeis,Sue Hanks, and Bruce Barrett. All rights reserved. 103” locomotive. Engineer Billy Rex Hall was inthe cab with Vincent along with Ernest LamarRuss who was qualifying as an AMTRAK engineer on this portion of the run.I can almost see the instrument lights as they
cast a soft, orange glow across the cab of the locomotive, highlighted by the light from the train’sheadlight bouncing off the impenetrable fog. Ican hear the three men calling out the colors of
the railroad signals (sort of like traffic lights forautomobiles) as they came into view and discussing the restrictions that would affect the trainover the next few miles. The new locomotive,shaped like a bullet, would have been the topic ofconversation. Engineers enjoy comparing the “olddays” with the new technology as it responds to
the movement of their hands on the controls as the train clipped along at 103.53 feet per second.
While the headlight beam may have reached1,000 feet in clear weather, given the dense fog,the visibility would more likely have been lessthan 100 feet. As the Bayou Canot Bridgeappeared in the fog, they would have had no hintof what lay ahead. Even if the headlight had detected the slight shift of the tracks to the left,
there would have been less than a second for Vincent to react. I can see his hand as he reached too
late for the emergency brake as the 150-ton locomotive turned into an uncontrollable beast and lurched to the left, starting a dive that wouldbury the locomotive 46 feet—equivalent to fivestories—into the muddy bank of the bayou.
I can sense the bridge collapsing under me and momentarily hear the locomotives and lead
cars dropping into the water and debris below. Ican feel the locomotive’s windshield glass against ’ SUNSET LIMITED my face and hands as it shatters inward. I cansee myself recoiling in terror as water and mud
extrude into the cab, helplessly entombing me and my two companions in our muddy coffin. At 2:33 a.m., twenty minutes earlier, Amtrak’sonly transcontinental passenger train, had eased outof the Mobile, Alabama station to continue its streakeastward, thirty-three minutes behind schedule—scheduled departure was 2:00 a.m. (Exhibit 1). It had been delayed in New Orleans for repairs to an airconditioner and toilets on two cars. The train, as it
left the Mobile station, consisted of three locomotives and eight cars and carried 202 passengers with a
crew of 18. By the time the train was ten miles out of Mobile, it had reached a speed of 72 mph (authorized speed was 70 mph). The green signals indicatedthat the train was free to “proceed” at maximum
track speed in spite of the dense fog, which reduced visibility to a few yards. At Mile Post 656.7 on the
Chesapeake and Ohio (CSX) main track, the Sunset Limited approached a wood-and-steel bridge spanning anavigable estuary called “Big Bayou Canot.”Although the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) had recommended that all railroad bridgesover navigable bodies of water be equipped with sensors to detect bridge damage, the Big Bayou CanotBridge was not so equipped. 4,7,8,10,12,13
None of the engineers survived. The three locomotive units came to rest on the east side of the
bayou. Part of Unit 819 was buried about 46 feet inthe mud, and the part protruding above the embankment caught fire and burned. The verified recordsindicate that in addition to the engines, a baggage
car, a baggage-dorm, and two coaches of the eight-cartrain dove into the 16 feet of water below the bridge.
The last four cars remained on the bridge.8The passenger cars in the bayou immediately
began to fill with water, and the diesel fuel from ruptured locomotive fuel tanks began to burn atop the
water. While some passengers were able to fight theirway to the surface, others were hopelessly trapped in
the wreckage. Parents lifted children to safety and, intheir continuing efforts to save others, became victims themselves. Others dove repeatedly into theblack waters in attempts to save fellow passengers. 7,10
Darkness prevailed outside the cars after thederailment. Battery-powered emergency lighting,
available inside coaches, provided some illumination, but only the train crew had penlights to use
while walking down the tracks in the dark. Once the cars entered the water, the emergency lighting
became inoperable, further complicating evacuationfrom the submerged cars. Without light from a few
penlights and from the fire that ensued following theaccident, no light would have been available.
Because emergency lighting was unavailable in thesubmerged cars, passengers had difficulty locating
and moving to exits.8Since most on-board service crewmembers were asleep in the dorm coach and since the train attendants were in the cars on the bridge, passengers inthe submerged cars had to make decisions on their
own and evacuate without assistance. Fortunately, afew passengers took control of the situation, located
exits, and told others what to do.13 Both the conductor and the assistant conductorwere in the diner car, the next to the last car on thetrain. The assistant conductor reported that the accident took place without warning—no setting up ofthe brakes, no horn blast, and no communication to the locomotive crew. He was thrown onto a table in
front of him and then into the middle of the car.The conductor was thrown over him. When the
train stopped, the conductor attempted to contactthe engineers in the lead locomotive using his
portable radio but received no reply.8The badly shaken but otherwise uninjured assistant conductor instantly contacted Warren Carr (theCSX trainmaster) who was responsible for monitoring all traffic in this portion of the CSX system andrequested immediate assistance. But, in the confusion and blackness he was able to give only a generallocation of the wreck.7The New York Times article entitled “Report Revises Times in Train Wreck” published October 8,1993, included the following transcripts of threecalls to 911 placed by Amtrak employees immediately after the accident.12 FIRST CALL: 3:01 A.M. The first two calls came from officials of CSX Transportation Inc., owner of the tracks and bridge.Warren Carr, an assistant terminal trainmaster inMobile, apparently made the first, to the Mobilepolice dispatcher.Mr. Carr tells the operator a train has derailed atBayou Sara drawbridge and that he understands people are in the water and the bridge is on fire.There are references to Prichard, a small town on the
edge of Mobile and Chickasabogue, or Chickasaw ’ SUNSET LIMITED Creek, five miles southwest of the accident site