Consider a repeated game in which the stage game above is repeated twice and the
ID: 1145555 • Letter: C
Question
Consider a repeated game in which the stage game above is repeated twice and there is no discounting. The following are SPNE outcomes in the repeated game (select all that apply)
(C,F) in the first period, (C,F) in the second period.
(B,F) in the first period, (B,F) in the second period.
(A,D) in the first period, (A,D) in the second period.
(B,F) in the first period, (C,E) in the second period
you can select more than one answer
a.(C,F) in the first period, (C,F) in the second period.
b.(B,F) in the first period, (B,F) in the second period.
c.(A,D) in the first period, (A,D) in the second period.
d.(B,F) in the first period, (C,E) in the second period
Player lI 6,6 2,7 2,-2 Player B 7,-4 -2,-2 1,-1 C 2,-2 1,1 1,1Explanation / Answer
There are 3 Nash equilibria here and these are given by (C,E),(B,F) and (C,F). Thus the correct answers in this case would be A,B and D.