Suppose we model the electoral conict in 2004 in Ukraine between supporters of Y
ID: 1201238 • Letter: S
Question
Suppose we model the electoral conict in 2004 in Ukraine between supporters of Yushchenko and Yanukovych as a game. Let’s say Yanukovych (who is already in power, and who won the disputed election) can either call for new elections or simply claim power. Let’s say Yushchenko can either attempt to gain power through protesting, or concede defeat. The utilities of the outcomes are:
1) Yan. calls for new elections, Yush. concedes defeat: (+2 for Yan., -2 for Yush.)
2) Yan. claims power, Yush. concedes defeat: (+6 for Yan., -10 for Yush.)
3) Yan. calls for new elections, Yush. protests: (-2 for Yan., +5 for Yush.)
4) Yan. claims power, Yush. protests: (-4 for Yan., +4 for Yush.)
A) Does either player have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
B) Are there any Nash equilibria? If so, what?
Explanation / Answer
yan/ush Concedes Defeat Protests
Claim Power 6 , -10 -4 , 4
Call For NEw Elections 2 , -2 -2, 5
Yush has a dominent strategy to Protest as yush's payoff from protesting are always greater then to concede Defeat regardless of the choice of Yan as his payoff are (4 , 5) for protest against (-10.-2) for conciding defeat.
Yes, there is a nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium is (-2,5) which is Yan will call for elections and Yush will Protest.
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