Please determine the pure strategy Nash equilibria. Suppose that player 1 instea
ID: 1216846 • Letter: P
Question
Please determine the pure strategy Nash equilibria. Suppose that player 1 instead has altruistic preferences, whose level of altruism is given by alpha = 0.5. That is, she cares about the sum of her own utility and half of her opponent's utility of the original game table. On the other hand, player 2 instead has Rawlsian preferences. That is, he cares about the minimum of the two utilities in each cell of the original game table. Draw the new game table incorporating the two players' new preferences and find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.Explanation / Answer
There is no nash equilibrium in this game. When player 2 does L, player 1 does U and when Player 2 does R Player 1 does D. Similarly when Player 1 does U, Player 2 does R and when Player 1 does D, Player 2 does L.
Hence no nash equillibrium