CHAPTER 18 - Case Synopsis— National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nel
ID: 365613 • Letter: C
Question
CHAPTER 18 - Case Synopsis—
National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson
Under new standards for all federal workers, contract employees with long-term access to federal facilities were ordered to complete a standard background check—the National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI). Robert Nelson and other Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) private contract employees filed a suit in a federal district court against NASA, claiming that the NACI violated their privacy rights. The court denied the plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the NACI, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and issued the injunction. NASA appealed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The government has long required and conducted employment investigations of applicants for the federal civil service. “Reasonable investigations of applicants and employees aid the Government in ensuring the security of its facilities and in employing a competent, reliable workforce.” Here, this requirement extended to contract employees with long-term access to federal facilities. The right to privacy is not violated by a government employer’s reasonable questions as part of a background check.
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Questions
The government’s interest in security has weighed more heavily in the balance against individual rights, particularly the right to privacy, in the twenty-first century than in previous decades. Why?
The Constitution does not explicitly mention a general right to privacy. From what sources does the Court infer this right?
Critical Thinking Question
Suppose that after the decision in this case, a JPL employee refuses to cooperate in a NACI background check. What would be the most likely consequences?
Explanation / Answer
FIPS 201 maintains personal privacy by adhering to federal privacy laws and policies. Data stored on the Badge is encrypted, with additional protection provided by a Personal Identification Number (PIN) chosen by the recipient. The PIN can only be accessed by a card reader. This makes it extremely difficult to duplicate or forge. Smart card chips include a variety of hardware and software capabilities that detect and react to tampering attempts and help counter possible attacks. The digital biometric data are encrypted in the card. The data are locked into the card by the issuing authority and cannot be modified by anyone other than the issuing authority. Social Security Numbers are not kept on the card. Instead, each person will have a unique identifier called a Uniform Universal Personal Identification Code (UUPIC) that is used in place of Social Security Numbers. The UUPIC is randomly generated and is not a variant of the person’s Social Security Number; therefore, the Social Security Number cannot be derived from the UUPIC.