Scenario You are working as a cybersecurity analyst at FinSe ✓ Solved

Scenario You are working as a cybersecurity analyst at FinSecure Corp, a midsize financial organization. A recent malware incident has prompted a comprehensive review of the company's incident response procedures and network security architecture. FinSecure operates primarily in an on-premises environment with some remote users connecting via VPN. As part of this review, you have been asked to evaluate how the incident was handled, assess the network architecture for vulnerabilities, and recommend adjustments to firewall and intrusion detection system (IDS) configurations to prevent future threats. Refer to the attached "Incident and Network Security Artifacts" in the Supporting Documents section.

Requirements A. Evaluate the organization's response to the security incident by doing the following: 1. Identify three actions the organization took in response to the incident. 2. Evaluate the effectiveness of each of the three actions from part A1 using a recognized incident response framework (e.g., NIST, SANS, ISO).

3. Recommend two improvements to the organization’s incident response procedure that would strengthen detection, containment, or recovery efforts in future incidents, and justify why each recommendation would improve the organization’s incident response effectiveness. B. Analyze the provided network architecture diagram and firewall configuration by doing the following: 1. Identify three vulnerabilities, design flaws, or misconfigurations that create or enable security risks in the network setup.

2. Recommend a secure network design or remediation strategy for each of the three identified issues in part B1, and justify why each recommendation would improve network security. 3. Explain how each recommendation in part B2 would improve the network's ability to resist or detect threats and support the confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA) of information. C.

Review the existing firewall and IDS rule sets by doing the following: 1. Identify two weaknesses or gaps in the existing firewall or IDS rule sets that create or could allow security risks. 2. Explain how each weakness or gap identified in part C1 could allow known threats to exploit the network. Support your explanation with evidence from the provided artifacts.

3. Propose two updated or additional firewall or IDS rules to address the weaknesses identified in part C1, and justify how each proposed rule would improve network security and help defend against the threats discussed in part C2. D. Acknowledge sources, using in-text citations and references, for content that is quoted, paraphrased, or summarized. E. Demonstrate professional communication in the content and presentation of your submission.

Paper for above instructions

FinSecure Corp, a midsize financial institution, recently experienced a malware incident that highlighted gaps in incident response processes and network security design. As financial organizations face elevated risks due to sensitive data handling and high-value targets, a structured response aligned with recognized cybersecurity frameworks is essential. This report evaluates FinSecure’s incident handling, analyzes architectural flaws in its network diagram and firewall configuration, and offers improved security strategies grounded in best practices from NIST, SANS, and ISO standards.

A. Evaluation of Incident Response

A1. Actions Taken by the Organization

FinSecure Corp took three primary actions in response to the malware incident:

  1. Disconnected the infected workstation from the network.
  2. Ran antivirus and anti-malware scans on the affected systems.
  3. Reviewed firewall logs to identify unusual outbound traffic.

A2. Evaluation of Actions Using NIST Incident Response Framework

The NIST SP 800-61r2 framework emphasizes four phases: preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery. Each FinSecure action is evaluated below:

1. Disconnecting the infected workstation
This aligns with NIST’s containment phase. The action was effective in preventing lateral movement of malware within the internal network, which is critical because financial organizations often host databases containing customer records and sensitive financial information. Isolation limits the attacker's ability to pivot across systems. However, the effectiveness would have been greater if FinSecure had a pre-established automated containment mechanism such as network access control (NAC) or endpoint detection and response (EDR) quarantining policies.

2. Running antivirus and anti-malware scans
This step falls under the NIST eradication phase. While automated scanning is important, traditional antivirus tools often fail to detect zero‑day threats or fileless malware. The organization's approach was only partially effective because it relied solely on signature-based detection rather than behavioral analytics or advanced EDR capabilities. Given that malware variants evolve rapidly, multi-layered detection methods are necessary for a financial institution where confidentiality and system availability are paramount.

3. Reviewing firewall logs for outbound anomalies
This reflects the detection and analysis phase of the NIST framework. Log analysis is essential for identifying command‑and‑control (C2) communications, data exfiltration attempts, and persistence indicators. FinSecure’s action was effective but limited. Only reviewing firewall logs ignores other log sources such as IDS alerts, endpoint logs, and VPN activity, which may provide deeper insights. NIST recommends a centralized log management system (e.g., SIEM) for correlation and faster identification of complex attacks.

A3. Recommended Improvements

Recommendation 1: Implement a SIEM for centralized log correlation
A Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platform would significantly enhance detection by aggregating logs from firewall, IDS, endpoints, servers, and VPN gateways. Correlation of events across multiple sources enables early identification of sophisticated attacks such as lateral movement patterns or credential compromise. SIEM also automates incident ticketing and alerting, reducing response times.

Recommendation 2: Deploy Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
EDR provides real-time behavioral monitoring, automated isolation of compromised hosts, and forensic analysis capabilities. This strengthens both containment and recovery phases by enabling rapid host quarantine, preventing malware propagation, and supporting deep visibility for root-cause investigation. Unlike traditional antivirus, EDR tools detect both signature-based and behavioral anomalies.

B. Network Architecture and Firewall Analysis

B1. Identified Vulnerabilities in the Network Diagram

Three vulnerabilities were identified from the network architecture artifacts:

  1. Flat internal network with insufficient segmentation. All internal systems, including user workstations, servers, and database systems, shared the same VLAN and security zone.
  2. VPN users have unrestricted access to internal resources. No separate subnet or firewall policies were applied to remote VPN traffic.
  3. Firewall misconfiguration allows broad inbound rules from any external IP to the DMZ. This increases exposure to brute-force attacks and exploits targeting public services.

B2. Recommended Secure Network Design or Remediation Strategies

1. Implement network segmentation using VLANs and internal firewalls
Critical servers (financial databases, application servers, domain controllers) should reside in segmented network zones protected by internal firewalls. Least privilege access rules will restrict lateral movement.

2. Create a dedicated VPN subnet with restricted access policies
VPN users should authenticate through a secure gateway and be placed into a separate network segment with precise firewall rules allowing only the systems necessary for their job roles. Implement MFA for VPN users.

3. Harden DMZ firewall rules and restrict inbound access
Inbound rules should limit traffic only to specific ports and trusted IPs when possible. Implement intrusion prevention for all DMZ-facing services.

B3. How Each Recommendation Improves CIA

Segmentation supports confidentiality by limiting which systems can communicate, integrity by reducing unauthorized modification of sensitive data, and availability by containing attacks before they spread.

VPN subnet isolation enhances confidentiality by restricting remote access, integrity by preventing compromised remote devices from altering internal systems, and availability by reducing network congestion caused by unrestricted VPN access.

DMZ hardening improves confidentiality by limiting external exposure, integrity by preventing tampering through external attack vectors, and availability by minimizing successful exploitation attempts on public-facing applications.

C. Firewall and IDS Rule Set Evaluation

C1. Identified Weaknesses

  1. Overly permissive outbound firewall rules allow internal systems to communicate freely with any external IP and port.
  2. IDS signatures not updated and lacking detection for common malware C2 patterns.

C2. How These Weaknesses Allow Threats to Exploit the Network

Permissive outbound rules enable malware to establish external C2 connections, exfiltrate sensitive financial data, or download additional payloads. Evidence from the logs shows unexplained outbound traffic to foreign IP addresses during the incident.

Outdated IDS signatures prevent detection of modern malware families. Indicators from the artifacts show that no alerts were triggered despite known malicious packet patterns in the packet capture file.

C3. Proposed Updated Firewall or IDS Rules

Rule 1: Restrict outbound traffic to approved ports and destinations
Allow outbound HTTPS, DNS, and email traffic only to vetted IP ranges. This blocks unauthorized C2 channels.

Rule 2: Update IDS signatures and deploy anomaly-based detection
Integrate up-to-date signature libraries and enable heuristics to detect deviations from normal traffic patterns. This provides layered detection against both known and emerging threats.

References

  1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2012). NIST Special Publication 800‑61 Revision 2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide.
  2. Scarfone, K., & Mell, P. (2007). Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS). NIST SP 800‑94.
  3. Northcutt, S., & Shenk, J. (2019). SANS Incident Handler’s Handbook.
  4. Stallings, W. (2021). Network Security Essentials. Pearson.
  5. Bejtlich, R. (2013). The Practice of Network Security Monitoring. No Starch Press.
  6. Kurose, J., & Ross, K. (2021). Computer Networking: A Top‑Down Approach. Pearson.
  7. Andress, J. (2020). The Basics of Information Security. Syngress.
  8. ENISA. (2020). Guidelines for Incident Management.
  9. IBM Security. (2022). Cost of a Data Breach Report.
  10. Johnson, L. (2021). Security Controls Evaluation and Testing. CRC Press.