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Renee Purtle bought a 1986 Chevrolet Blazer from Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc. To fi

ID: 467989 • Letter: R

Question

Renee Purtle bought a 1986 Chevrolet Blazer from Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc. To finance the purchase through Eldridge, Purtle filled out a credit application on which she misrepresented her employment status. Based on the misrepresentation, Eldridge extended credit. In the credit contract, Eldridge did not disclose the finance charge, the annual percentage rate, or the total sales price or use the term "amount financed" as the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) and its regulations require. Purtle defaulted on the loan, and Eldridge repossessed the vehicle. Purtle filed a suit in a federal district court against Eldridge, alleging violations of the TILA. The court awarded Purtle $1,000 in damages, plus attorneys' fees and costs. Eldridge appealed, arguing in part that Purtle was not entitled to damages because she had committed fraud on her credit application. Considering these facts, please answer the following questions. 1) How should the appellate court rule in this case, and why? 2) Should the plaintiff be allowed to sue if the she defaulted on the loan? Why or why not? The subject is legal environment of business.

Explanation / Answer

Here Eldridge agreed to extend credit to Purtle to purchase the car. Purtle allegedly made several materials hide or give insufficient information about her employment. Because she did not have the cash to pay cash for the car, Purtle requested financing from Eldridge and filled out a credit application.

After Purtle defaulted on her payments for several weeks, Eldridge take back the car. Although Purtle made several installment payments to Eldridge, many were late and several tendered checks were worthless. Actually Purtle was to make weekly payments of $60.00 to Eldridge until the balance of $6,890.60 was paid. These two documents constitute the entire agreement of the parties. Pursuant to the sale, the parties executed two documents: (1) a Bill of Sale and Car Invoice, and (2) a Conditional Sales Contract.

Eldridge submits the following issues for review:

Whether Purtle is entitled to recover statutory damages under the TILA despite the fact that she fraudulently induced Eldridge to enter into the credit agreement upon which her damages are based and admits that she suffered no actual damages and fully understood all of her credit terms

Whether Purtle's award of attorney's fees was excessive in light of her fraudulent inducement of the credit agreement, Eldridge's lack of culpability or bad faith, the Congressional purpose underlying the TILA, and Purtle's actual recovery

The district court did award Purtle $5,242.50 in attorney's fees and $201.55 in costs. The court also declined to award attorney's fees for the time Purtle's attorneys spent. The extent that the fees of Purtle's two attorneys were duplicative, the district court awarded one fee. Noting that this is a straightforward TILA case, the district court determined that it did not require the expertise of more than one lawyer. The district court then turned to the issue of attorney's fees and reviewed Purtle's petition for attorney's fees, the accompanying time logs of her attorneys.

2.

According to this case, company should have to verify all documents and valid materials pre purchase to ignore these kinds of issues, But the purchased already done so the company have to keep track about Purtle after 2-3 fault or delay in pavement and take proper action which save damages and attorney fee according to company policy.

Eldridge argues that because Purtle suffered no actual damages and fully understood her credit terms, the district court should have considered the congressional purpose underlying the TILA as a factor in determining its award of attorney's fees.

Purtle's fraudulent inducement of the credit agreement demonstrates the undesirability of the case because her recovery, if any, encourages the perpetration of fraud and permits a culpable party to benefit from her own fraudulent conduct. Eldridge contends that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Purtle fraudulently induced Eldridge to enter into a credit agreement upon which her statutory damages were based.